Battle in Myanmar

Battle in Myanmar

Maing-yang Battle(Young Major Tin Aung Myint Oo was awarded the Thiha-Thura medal)

It was the third week of September 1988, and the place was Maing-shu the little town between   Salween River and Nangh-pan Stream in Southern Shan Sate. I had just become the battalion commander of IB-6 (Infantry Battalion – 6) in July that year. 

Unfortunately the country was in turmoil just after the 8-8-88 Uprising when I got my battalion CO promotion. Even though our battalion then was serving in Maing-shu the Battalion HQ was in Yangon’s Shwe Pyi Thar.

So we really had to worry for our families back in Yangon where law and order had completely broken down after the sudden fall of General Nay Win’s BSPP Government and the brutal mob anarchy had been going on for weeks and weeks now.

And I had to keep in touch constantly with the Battalion HQ by a wireless radio. Fortunately I had left a radio set in the battalion workshop and we could use that set for communication between us on the frontline and the battalion HQ in Yangon.

“How are things? Tell us the situations there. Are there any serious dangers?”

“Post sentries around the battalion compound day and night. Send out the patrols too. Absolutely do not let any family out of the compound. Check thoroughly all the coming in and going out. If necessary, all the ranks and files back there must be ready to take arms and fight the mob.”

“Don’t lose contact with us on the front line. Take care the security of all our families.”

I had to keep on telling them constantly on the radio. We also didn’t dare to turn on that radio set during daytime as the political situation was so precarious. We dared to turn on that set only at the midnight when everyone else was sleeping. But at least we knew what was really going on back then in Rangoon in the middle of the Uprising.

Even in our Maing-shu the restless town-people had tried to protest. Anti-government posters were posted and the mob gathered at the town centre. Their leader was Maing-shu Buddhist Monk U Wimala. But I used all possible means I had and thus managed to arrest all the protest leaders and finally quelled the protest demonstrations.

Then on September 18, 1988 our army staged the coup and took over the Government and slowly everything calmed down and eventually the whole country was back to normal. But my peace of mind didn’t last long too long as the bad news came in at 10 in the morning of September 23.

“CO, CPB forces are attacking Maing-yang,” came in and reported my Chin IO Captain Htan Kyint Htaung.

“Hay,” was the only word I could manage to say back to him. 

IB-11 (Infantry Battalion-11) was in Maing-yang and its Commanding Officer was Major Soe Lwin who was my classmate back in the OTS. We also had served together almost two years from 1979 to 1981 in the Army Infantry School at Ba Htoo Town. Not only that, we were also together at the General Staff College in 1986.

He was really smart and in whatever school he attended he always finished first or second in the class. He graduated Second at the General Staff College and together with the First, Major Soe Win, they became the first ever battalion Commanding Officers from our batch. At the time of Second Maing-yang Battle I was just promoted to the CO of IB-6 but he had been the CO of IB-11 for more than a year.

The whole day we kept our Motorola Radio set on and constantly listened to the situations of the raging battle at Maing-yang.

Army had established Wireless Relay Stations at the strategic locations in the Sector east of Salween River and portable Motorola sets with speaking range of 100/200 miles were issued to the army units in the area. Our Maing-shu battalion had one of those Motorola sets and we could communicate with the nearby battalions and thus we knew the Maing-yang battle situations by the minutes.

By then I was extremely worried about my friend Major Soe Lwin as we were aware of the massive strength of CPB forces his battalion was now fighting off at Maing-yang.

“CO, Maing-yang CO has fallen in the battle!” reported my IO Captain Htan Kyint Htaung.

“Hay,” was the only word I could mutter back.

“How?”

“Enemy’s heavy-weapon, Sir.”

“Oh.”

“Rest in Peace, my friend. Soldier never dies and even if he dies he will not go to Hell!”

One of my close friends and comrades has sacrificed his life for the country and army.

That night I could not sleep at all. I thought about Just-finished Uprising. About the periods I and Soe Lwin were together. The close relationship between our two families. His wife Ah Yee and three children. And the still-going-on Battle of Maing-yang, etcetera, etcetera. Never ending thoughts.

Maing-yang was the little town kept on being tripped over by the Communist Party of Burma(Myanmar) since CPB started its North-eastern War Region. Being in the Kengtung Region east of Salween River, Maing-yang and Mainy-yaung were the remote frontier towns by the Chinese border then controlled by CPB forces.

And CPB had frequently tested two border towns and now less than a week after  the 8-8-88 Uprising they attacked Maing-yang again.

Thinking all that I could not fall asleep that night. My question was why did CPB attack Maing-yang again?

 

Maing-yang Battle(Young Major Tin Aung Myint Oo was awarded the Thiha-Thura medal)

After losing the huge battle at Si-si Wanterpang in 1986 the Communists were devastated. CPB had started that Battle as a morale boasting show of their strength and military capability after the Chinese Communist Party had cut off their arms and manpower support to the Myanmar Communists.

Chairman Mao was dead and the new paramount leader (Black Cat/White Cat) Deng Xiao Ping wanted to reinvent China and CPB was in the way in rebuilding good neighborly relationship between China and Myanmar.

But instead of gaining the new territory CPB had lost Kyu-kote, Pang-saing, Mang-hiro, Kung-haing, and Naung-mah their important territories by the borderline to the Burmese Army. The architect and overall leader of that battle Yebaw Aung (a) Blackie Bo Myo Myint had to flee back to his sanctuary in China with his tail between the legs.

Because of unfavorable situations the CPB Central Committee even had to abolish its War Myanmar and armed-Divisions and wait for better situations again. And their fortunate time came in 1988.

A student uprising had started in Yangon on March 12, 1988 when Phone Maw a student from RIT (Rangoon(Yangon) Institute of Technology) was killed in the police operation after a teashop brawl near RIT.

Back then Yebaw Htun (a) Bo Kyin Maung (current CPB General Secretary) from CPB Northern Bureau was the boss of Communist UG or Underground operations in the major cities like Rangoon and Mandalay. He has set up CPB UG cells nationwide to create disturbances as the opportunity arises.

All his long Communist life Bo Kyin Maung has managed the UG operation for CPB and he prefers the UG revolution to the armed revolution.  So in the crucial times of 1988 he became fervently active with the support of CPB Chairman Ba Thein Tin on the border to bring down Ne Win’s BSPP Socialist Government in Yangon. And he finally did. Myanmar’s Socialist Government fell in September 1988.

8-8-88 Uprising actually was initiated and participated by the CPB UG cells in Rangoon. Having known the situations very well Chairman Ba thein Tin had taken full advantage of the public disturbances and planned for the eventual Communist takeover of the State Power.

CPB Radio had broadcasted many declarations for the support of Uprising. And the protesting students were praised as the revolutionary heroes in their broadcasts. CPB Central Committee had even moved down from remote Pang-sang to Mone-koe which was easily communicable from all over the country.

A CPB Politburo meeting was staged at Mone-koe and detail plans to snatch the State power were drawn up there.  

“If we can go in and skillfully handle the current political situation in Yangon I am certain that we will achieve the State Power,” said CPB Chairman Ba Thein Tin with confidence.

As the planned two-prone attack CPB had gathered its armed units and also stockpiled arms and ammunitions in the jungle camps by the Chinese border for the imminent assault on the Government forces while its UG cells and clandestine Radio were stoking hard the flames of Uprising in Yangon and other cities.

But the CPB was caught short when the Army took over the Government on September 18, 1988 and brought down the nationwide disturbances under control and rapidly re-established law and order with deadly force. So they began a propaganda war on their radio.

“Democracy is brutally terminated. Pick up any weapon and fight against the military government. Follow the Chairman Mao’s teachings and grab the power by force,” broadcasted constantly by the CPB Radio.

“We shouldn’t be waiting too long. Before too late, with the forces already gathered we must attack a winnable place and take hold of it,” directed Ba Thein Tin to his Communist cadres and officers.

Even though he had been in Mone-koe directing the UG operations since early September 1988, once the army has taken over the country Ba Thein Tin rushed back from Mone-koe to Pang-sang. And as soon as he was there he ordered the CPB Central War Commission to launch the battle.

CPB War Commission already had a detail plan to attack Maing-yang the nearest town from their Pang-sang and they’d been waiting for the green light from Chairman Ba Thein Tin. Thus the Second Battle of Maing-yang began in the early morning of September 23, 1988 when more than 2,000 strong CPB forces came into Maing-yang.

I would like to describe the geography of Maing-yang the last major target of CPB before its sudden implosion just a few months later.

The little town Maing-yang was located roughly between the Latitude 99 and 100 degrees and between the Longitude 21 and 22 degrees in the Eastern Shan State. It is at the North of Kengtung the capital of Eastern Shan State and 65 miles away from Kengtung. It is only 30 or 40 miles away from the People Republic of China.

During the old feudal times Maing-yang was ruled by a Town-Lord (Phayar-Yang) under the Sawbwa (Saopha) of Kengtung (Kyaing Tong). The populace of Maing-yang consists mainly of Li-shan, Gon-shan, Akha-lahu, Lishaw, and Wa people.

Maing-yang is the most northern town of Eastern Shan State. Even though it was only 65 miles away from Kengtung, to reach there was extremely difficult as the roads were bad. By car it normally took 4 to 5 hours from Kengtung. The Kengtung-Maingyang vehicular road passes through Wanterpun, Maing-khat, and Maing-lway.

The town basically is on a small valley plain surrounded by high mountains with the soaring heights of 3, 4, and 5,000 feet. In Shan language Yang is a plain and Maing-yang basically means a town built on the plain land. But there are small hillocks at the western outskirt of the town.

At the north of Maing-yang were Ho-tong and Maing-phyan and at the west is Maing-pauk all of which were Brown Territories (Insurgent-controlled areas). At the east is Si-loo also a CPB-controlled area. At the south are Main-khat and Kengtung.

Maing-yang basically was a sweet fruit surrounded by thorny bushes and CPB picked the small town many times to test our troops garrisoned there. And in the early morning on 19 April 1980 nearly 1,500 strong CPB forces attacked the three army companies from the First Column of LIB-108 (Light Infantry Battalion-108) on the garrison duty at Maing-yang.

The battle lasted more than six hours that day, but the numerically superior CPB forces couldn’t overrun our strong defense and finally had to withdraw. The casualties from both sides were 79 from the army and 194 from the CPB for that First Maing-yang Battle.

Now the CPB was preparing again for the Second battle of Maing-yang and their last major battle on our Myanmar soil.

In early September 1988 the extended War Commission of CPB had a war meeting in Pang-sang. The meeting was attended by Lin Htin (a) Yebaw Soe Thein, the Political Commissar of North-East War Region, Yebaw Ohn Kyi, the Military Commander of Northern Bureau, Yebaw Kyi Myint, the Deputy Military Commander of Northern Bureau, Yebaw Htun Lwin, a brigade commander from Northern Bureau, and Yebaw Soe Lin, the Chief of War Region 815.

That meeting had decided to attack Maing-yang and formed the eleven person supervising committee headed by Lin Htin (a) Yebaw Soe Thein for the battle. And the following CPB troops were assigned for the battle.

Battalion-4048 of the First Brigade.

Battalion-501 of the Third Brigade.

Battalion-081, 085, and 087 of the Fifth Brigade.

Battalion-503 of the Seventh Brigade.

Battalion-083 of the Eighth Brigade.

Battalion-3, 6, and 9 of Brigade-815.

Troops extracted from Brigade-851 aka the Guard Brigade, CPB Central. 

 

Maing-yang Battle(Young Major Tin Aung Myint Oo was awarded the Thiha-Thura medal)

All together more than 2,000 troops supported by 60mm, 80mm, and 120mm assorted heavy mortars, 57mm and 75mm recoilless guns, .50 heavy duty machine guns, and hundreds of RPG launchers.

Their strategic dream was to set up the Maing-yang based Provisional People’s Government once they got hold of the town and then to expand their so-called liberated area of Burma form there.

The only obstacle for those more than 2,000 strong Communist forces to successfully implement their grand plan was the less than 400 strong troops of Burmese Army Frontline Infantry Battalion-11 on the garrison duty then at Maing-yang.

Burmese Army then had following units inside the Sector north of Kengtung covering a very large area.

The HQ and the Heavy-weapon company of frontline IB-11’s First Column was on the garrison duty in Maing-yang Town. Their fortified base was on the Aung-da-ghun Hill inside the town.

Another rifle company of frontline IB-11’s First Column was active as a mobile column between Maing-yang and Si-loo.

A rifle company of frontline IB-11’s Second Column was on the garrison duty at the Aung-tha-byay and Aung-myay Hills on the eastern outskirt of Maing-yang Town.

Another rifle company of frontline IB-11’s Second Column was active as a mobile column near those Aung-tha-byay and Aung-myay Hills.

All together 4 companies of IB-11 were in the Maing-yang Town while another rifle company of frontline IB-11 was on the garrison duty in nearby Maing-lway between Maing-khat and Maing-yang.

The HQ of Tactical Operations Command 881 (TOC-881) and three rifle companies of frontline Sixth Burma Rifles Battalion’s First Column were at Maing-khat.

Another rifle company of frontline Sixth Burma Rifles Battalion’s Second Column was active as a mobile reserve column in the areas of Lwe-yote, Lwe-mee, and Wanterpang.

The HQ and a rifle company of frontline First Kayah Rifles Battalion’s First Column were on the Kyat-u-taung (Egg Mountain).

Another rifle company of frontline First Kayah Rifles Battalion’s First Column was active as a mobile column in the area north of Kyat-u-taung (Egg Mountain).

The HQ of frontline LID-88 (Light Infantry Division-88) with the five companies of frontline IB-14 was in the Kengtung City.

Organization wise, LID-88 had 3 Tactical Operations Command, TOC-881 and 882 and 883, and each TOC had 3 infantry battalions. With one reserve battalion the LID-88 had 10 infantry battalions in total. Back in 1988 the three rifle battalions of TOC-881 were IB-11 in Maing-yang and Sixth Burma Rifles Battalion and First Kayah Rifles Battalion both in Maing-khat. The LID-88’s reserve battalion then was IB-14 in Kengtung.

Since the beginning of September 1988 Communist forces were active in the immediate surrounds of Maing-yang Town. Their troops from Pang-sang were moving down south towards Maing-yang. The local rumors of imminent attack on the town were popping up here and there too.

Accordingly the LID-88 HQ in Kengtung sent up two companies from IB-19 which arrived in Kengtung just two days before the Maing-yang Battle to the Maing-yang area. Unfortunately that IB-19 column was ambushed by the CPB advanced forces just before Mine-lway and their Battalion CO was killed and the column could not reach the target.

Since early September even before the actual Battle broke out CPB forces were testing our forces at Maing-yang. By frequent engagements with the army patrols they were gradually closing onto the town. Three enemy columns were seen approaching Maing-yang from both east and west of the town. 

In the morning on the first day of the battle the enemy began to attack the Aung-tha-byay Hill the garrison base of IB-11’s Second Column led by the DCO Major Tin Aung Myint Oo.

The mobile company there had repelled the CPB attackers and chased them but another CPB unit 100 strong was waiting for them at the Wan-kyone Monastery south of Aung-tha-byay Hill. The battle ensued and the army company had to withdraw back to the Aung-tha-byay Hill.

Another 100 more CPB troops arrived at the monastery and with the heavy-weapon support they attacked the Aung-tha-byay hill again. The ensuing battle lasted whole day and only at night the enemy withdrew as they couldn’t overrun the army’s strong defense positions.

CPB seemed to be just testing the strength of IB-11 Second Column as their preliminary attack before the arrival of their main forces. That day DCO Major Tin Aung Myint Oo was hit on his right wrist by a heavy-weapon shell’s shrapnel and severely wounded with his right hand broken.

 

Maing-yang Battle(Young Major Tin Aung Myint Oo was awarded the Thiha-Thura medal)

September 17

After being completely quiet for two days on September 15 and 16 the enemy shelled our positions with 82mm Mortars and .50 heavy machine guns from morning to midday on September 17 as more than 1,000 strong Communist forces from their brigade-768 and 815 finally arrived at West Maing-yang.

Only when IB-11 responded with heavy-weapons CPB stopped shelling and withdrew back to the west of the town. Next 4-5 days CPB forces had waited for the arrive of more troops and heavy-weapons and by September 22 the CPB strength in the vicinity of Maing-yang reached to more than 2,000.

September 23

The news from the townfolks confirmed that all the CPB forces destined for the battle were at Maing-yang by then. From the night of September 22 the CPB heavy-weapon units now in the west and south of the town were constantly shelling the army positions till the morning of September 23.

In the morning of September 23 about 200 strong CPB force charged at the La-min Hill. Their four bayonet charges were repelled by the two army platoons on the hill with the help of our heavy-weapon fire from the main Aung-da-ghun Hill.

But the enemy had reinforced their attacking force with 200 more men and kept on charging at the hill. Outnumbered and outgunned our units finally abandoned the La-min Hill and withdrew back to the main Aung-da-ghun Hill.

Meanwhile, a 100 strong CPB unit attacked the army platoon on the Yan-shin Hill from the south-west and the platoon had to abandon the hill and withdrew back to the main Aung-da-ghun Hill.

Once the enemy had occupied the La-min and Yan-shin hills they brought their 57mm recoilless guns and .50 caliber heavy machine guns onto the hill and started their heavy-weapon assault on the Aung-da-ghun Hill where the IB-11’s HQ and its First Column was.

They also shelled the nearby Pha-yar Hill. At about 11 in the late morning at least 400 of them had bayonet-charged the Pha-yar Hill repeatedly for six times. During the sixth charge our Lieutenant Thant Zin the post in-charge was severely wounded and the army unit there had to abandon the hill and withdrew back to the main Aung-da-ghun Hill.

Once they got hold of all three hills, La-min and Yan-shin and Pha-yar hills, the enemy had put their heavy-weapons on those hills and unleashed heavy barrages onto the Aung-da-ghun Hill their main target. Our hill also returned the enemy fire with our 60mm and 80mm mortars.

Enemy’s 500 strong infantry under the protection of their heavy-weapon support then bayonet-charged the Aung-da-ghun Hill from all possible directions. IB-11 CO Major Soe Lwin ordered his men to fire at the charging enemy with 84mm Carl-Gustav launcher.

That launcher was a very effective weapon but the CO himself was required to supervise the firing. Knowing that fact the enemy had immediately responded by firing all their straight-shooting 57mm small recoilless guns together at our launcher site.

And at about 5 in the late afternoon of September 23 the battalion CO Major Soe Lwin was instantly killed by a shell fired from one of enemy’s 57mm recoilless guns. 

Once the CO had fallen the Deputy CO Major Tin Aung Myint Oo who was severely wounded in the September 14 attack on his Aung-tha-byay Hill and brought back temporarily to Aung-da-ghun Hill had taken charge of the under-siege battalion and led the hand-to-hand battles against overwhelming CPB forces now surrounding the Hill and repeatedly bayonet-charging the defenders.

September 24

Once they knew that more than 2,000 CPB forces were now attacking Maing-yang Major Sein Aye and his company previously active as a mobile column near Aung-tha-byay Hill moved in and merged with IB-11 Second Column on the Aung-myay Hill in the evening of September 23.

From there they marched further into town towards the Aung-da-ghun Hill. At about 5:30 in the early morning of September 24 they engaged a more than 300 strong enemy units near the Aung-da-ghun Hill and a huge battle had ensued.

But the Company managed to forcefully penetrate through the enemy lines and merged with our forces on the Aung-da-ghun Hill at about 6:30 in the morning.

By then the enemy infantry circling the Aung-da-ghun Hill were repeatedly bayonet-charging at the hill while their heavy-weapon teams on the nearby La-min and Yan-shin and Pha-yar hills were constantly shelling as fire-support.

But, about 8 in the morning our aerial support arrived in the form of four PC-7 fighter-bomber planes from our Air Force. The planes had arrived just in time as the CPB forces were on the verge of their final bayonet-charge to completely finish off the rapidly weakening defenders on the Aung-da-ghun Hill.

Because of our aerial bombardment the enemy charge had temporarily stopped. But once the airplanes departed after dropping all their bombs and firing their rockets CPB forces unleashed the second bayonet charge.

Our planes had come back again and launched the second aerial bombardment and that second assault took out so many of their men and stopped the enemy bayonet-charges for that day.

September 25

On September 25 enemy began to attack Aung-da-ghun Hill very early on 5:30 in the morning while their heavy-weapon teams on the surrounding hills basically held down our forces on the Aung-myay Hill by shelling constantly.

Between 7 and 9 in the morning that day they had bayonet-charged our Aung-da-ghun Hill eleven times. The fences were breached and hand-to-hand combats were all over the hill as enemy was able to reach inside the army camp.

But our air-support timely arrived at about 9:30 that morning and bombed the enemy just outside our camp. That aerial bombardment achieved so many direct hits and punished enemy so hard that they were forced to stop their brutal bayonet-charges for that day.

Casualties were high for both sides that day as almost everything on the hill was destroyed. Dead and dying from both sides filled the Hill and their blood had formed large pools on the Hill.

Enemy appeared to have used all available forces to overrun our forces on the Aung-da-ghun Hill that day. But because of our air-support the momentum of enemy attack was basically halted on that same day.

September 26

Enemy had reinforced their depleting forces on the recently occupied hills with new arrivals and started attacking our hills again. But at midday that day our air force planes came and repeatedly bombed enemy positions on the Yan-bauk Hill and On-lar-gyaw range.

The devastated enemy then carried their wounded and withdrew towards Wan-kyin-san-dauk. Like the day before enemy was severely beaten by aerial bombardment again that day and because of high casualties they couldn’t bayonet-charge as many times as yesterday.

September 27

On September 27 enemy had given up on attacking Aung-da-ghun Hill. Instead their about 300 strong force attacked our Aung-myay Hill the whole day from about 6:30 in the early morning.

Finally they broke through the fences but our forces repelled them by blowing them up with controlled-mines. At dusk the enemy had bayonet-charged the hill again, but had to withdraw again after suffering heavy losses.

That evening LID-88 HQ had ordered the IB-11 Second Column at Aung-myay Hill to   merge with IB-11 HQ and its First Column at Aung-da-ghun Hill. At 7 in the night of September 28 Major Phe Chit’s Company of IB-11 Second Column abandoned the Aung-myay Hill and marched towards Aung-da-ghun Hill.

That column was shot at by enemy from the Mon-ke-pha-yar Hill and On-la-gyaw Range at the east of Maing-yang Town. But the Second Column had successfully cleared the enemy along their way and reached Aung-da-ghun Hill in the morning of September 28.

September 28

By September 28 all four companies of IB-11 in Maing-yang town were together on the main Aung-da-ghun Hill the battalion’s frontline HQ. They had consolidated their defense lines and repositioned their men and their heavy-weapons. And they had eagerly waited for the enemy bayonet-charges they thought were coming again like the days before.

By then CPB also had re-distributed their forces on various hills under their control. There were about 300 men each on Aung-myay and Aung-tha-byay hills, nearly 100 on the On-la-gyaw Range, and about 300 each on Pha-yar and La-min and Yan-shin hills. They were still shelling our Aung-da-ghun Hill with Heavy-weapons but not as frequent as before.

That day our air force planes showed up again. The PC-7 fighter-bombers then dropped bombs and fired rockets onto the enemy heavy-weapon positions. The results were so many direct hits on their heavy-weapon crews.

Later we heard that the enemy morale had completely collapsed after suffering heavy casualties from that aerial attack and they stopped the shelling of Aung-da-ghun Hill still standing after so many brutal, human-wave bayonet-charges.

September 29

There were no more enemy bayonet-charges onto the Aung-da-ghun Hill as our air force planes were constantly attacking the CPB positions on their hills. The news of massive CPB casualties including some of their top leaders had reached even to our forces on the Aung-da-ghun Hill. By the midnight of September 29 the Miang-yang Town was completely quiet as enemy firing had stopped.

September 30

As there were no more hostile shootings from the enemy DCO Major Tin Aung Myint Oo sent out the rifle company led by Captain Thant Zin to Pha-yar Hill first. They cleared the Hill and found 25 enemy corpses there.

They continued onto the Yan-shin Hill and then La-min Hill and found 71 more enemy corpses in the area. The CPB forces had already gone from Maing-yang since the night of September 29. And the enemy had taken their wounded with them. But they had left their dead comrades at wherever they fell.

 

Maing-yang Battle(Young Major Tin Aung Myint Oo was awarded the Thiha-Thura medal)

Frontline IB-14 (Kha-la-ya 14)

As soon as the news of Maing-yang battle reached the TOC-881 in Maing-khat and then LID-88 in Kengtung other army units in the area were put into action to support and reinforce the IB-11 inside Maing-yang Town.

Expecting that action CPB also sent out a large force to the Maing-lway area to intercept the army reinforcements and stop them there. Followings are the actions and engagements with the enemy of other army units sent into the Maing-lway and Maing-yang.

September 23

LID-88 CO Brigadier Thein Han had immediately sent three rifle companies of IB-14 kept as the reserve at Kengtung to Maing-yang that day once the news of the Maing-yang Battle reached him.

Battalion CO Lt. Colonel Aung Kyi and his three companies left Kengtung on midday and reached Maing-khat on the midday of September 24. He left one of his companies at Maing-khat as the reserve for TOC-881 and continued onto Maing-yang with two companies as the First Column of IB-14.

September 25

The IB-14’s First Column and its two companies marched the whole night of September 24 and reached Maing-lway at about midday of September 25. They engaged with about 100 strong CPB forces waiting for them at the Maing-lway Monastery.

The battle lasted for the rest of the day while the enemy there was multiplying by the new arrivals. By evening the enemy strength had reached to more than 400 and the IB-14 First Column had to tactically withdraw in the darkness as their casualties were alarmingly increasing.

September 26

In the morning of September 26 the IB-14’s First Column continued onto Main-yang as planned and reached the Village of Yang-khaing at 10 in the morning. The Column continued onto the Yin-kwe Mountain.

Meanwhile the IB-14’s Second Column was marching to engage the CPB forces at Maing-laway in September 27.

At there in the afternoon the First Column engaged with about 200 strong CPB forces waiting for them. The battle ensued but the casualties were low and the enemy finally withdrew towards east at about 6:30 in the evening.

September 28

In the morning of September 28 the IB-14’s First Column marched back to Main-lway to meet up with the IB-14’s Second Column clearing the CPB forces at Maing-lway.

The road to Maing-yang was wide open for the army reinforcements as the CPB blockages had been removed by the IB-14 Frist Column led by Lt. Col. Aung Kyi.

TOC-881 (Na-ba-ha 881)

September 25

TOC-881 Commander Colonel Ye Myint had to wait for the arrival of First Column and Second Column of IB-14 coming from Kengtung.

IB-14’s Second Column with two companies led by DCO Major Aung Myo Lwin left Kengtung on the midday of September 25 and reached Maing-khat on September 26. TOC-881 there and IB-14’s Second Column then started heading towards Maing-laway the same day.

September 27

TOC-881 and IB-14’s Second Column reached Maing-lway on midday September 27 and engaged with the enemy waiting there. About 150 strong CPB forces attacked them at the Maing-lway Monastery but later withdrew after a heavy battle involving hand-to-hand combats resulting heavy casualties on both sides.

September 28

In the morning of September 28 TOC-881 and IB-14’s Second Column met up with IB-14’s First Column in Maing-lway and they continued towards Maing-yang. At 3 in the afternoon the whole column reached Pharpun-phayar Hill near Maing-yang and engaged with some CPB forces there.

Captain Kyaw Zeya’s Company left in Maing-kaht also left there that night and by September 29 night our TOC-881 and the whole IB-14 were ready to reinforce the Maing-yang Garrison.

September 30

The whole column of TOC-881 and IB-14 left for Maing-yang early that morning and reached there at around 9 in the morning. They immediately cleared the La-min and Yan-shin hills used by the enemy as the bases in attacking our Aung-da-ghun Hill.

Our columns finally reached Aung-da-ghun Hill that afternoon. Various skirmishes some large and some small were still occurring around town as our columns continued on to clear the enemy remnants still in the town and the surrounds.

And more than 20 enemy combatants were killed when our columns recaptured the Aung-myay Hill that evening.

Frontline Sixth Burma Rifles Battalion (Tha-na-ka 6)

September 23

TOC-881 Commander Colonel Ye Myint had immediately sent four rifle platoons of Sixth Burma Rifles’ First Column led by the battalion CO Lt. Col. San Thein kept as the reserve at Maing-khat to Maing-yang that day once the news of the Maing-yang Battle reached him.

Frontline Sixth Burma Rifles’ First Column and its four platoons left Maing-khat on the midday that day.

September 24

The Column engaged with some enemy forces and reached Maing-laway the morning of September 24. They merged with some units form IB-11’s First Company at Maing-lway and continued on towards Maing-yang. At around 1 in the afternoon 200 strong enemy attacked our column and after the ensuing battle our forces withdrew back to Maing-lway to re-gather the troops.

September 25

As the Column left Main-lway again and trying to march towards Maing-yang the strong enemy forces waiting at Maing-lway Pha-yar Hill attacked again. The battle lasted the whole day and our column was unable to forward as they were held up in Maing-lway.

September 26

On September 26 our Sixth Burma Rifles’ First Column merged with the IB-11’s First Company at Maing-lway and continued onto Maing-yang. On the way our Column was engaged by 150 strong enemy but they were repelled.

September 27

On September 27, with the heavy-weapon support our column attacked the nearby range occupied by more than 200 strong enemy forces. The enemy finally withdrew towards north.

September 28-29

Our Sixth Burma Column chased the withdrawing enemy and forced most of them to withdraw farther towards east. Our Column occupied the strategic hills around Maing-lway and provided heavy-weapon fire support to the TOC-881 and Frontline IB-14 during the last few days of the Maing-yang Battle.

The Second Battle of Maing-yang was truly over by September 30 as all enemy forces were cleared not just from the Maing-yang Town but also from its surrounds.

Conclusion of the Second Battle of Maing-yang

We had lost 4 officers and 46 other ranks in the main Battle alone. Nine officers and 111 other ranks were wounded. 202 bodies were left by the CPB and according to the radio intercepts and local intelligence at least a thousand were wounded on the enemy side.

As soon as the battle was over LID-88 Commander Brigadier Thein Han traveled to Maing-yang by helicopter and met all the army men there for encouraging congratulations. He also met up with the town folks and thanked them for their help during the siege.

After that he brought Major Tin Aung Myint Oo and other seriously wounded back with him to Kengtung for preliminary medical treatment and then sent the severely wounded to the General Military Hospital at Mingaladon in Rangoon.

The whole IB-11 from Maing-yang was later brought back to Kengtung for a well deserved R&R while the Frontline Sixth Burma Rifles Battalion took on the garrison duty at maing-yang.

The Second Maing-yang Battle was the last major battle of Burmese Communist Party on  Burmese soil. Having huge casualties especially among the majority Wa ranks-and-files from their armed-units the ethnic Wa leaders finally rebelled against the ethnic Burmese leadership of CPB in early 1989.

The Wa captured Pang-sang the CPB HQ in April 1989 and immediately asked our Army for a ceasefire agreement. The spectacular and sudden implosion of CPB after more than 40 years long armed-rebellion in 1989 April was basically the direct result of Second Maing-yang Battle in 1988 September.

The Second Battle of Maing-yang was a strategic turning point in the unfortunate history of long-running Civil War in Burma.

Official Summary for decorating Tin Aung Myint Oo

Despite his serious wounds Major Tin Aung Myint Oo had led his battalion into the battle of Maing-yang occurred from 23-09-1988 to 29-09-1988 when his battalion commander was killed on 23-09-1988.

Being an exemplary commander he had repelled almost countless times the overwhelming CPB bayonet-charges conducted repeatedly with enemy’s massive manpower and heavy-weapon support.

Whenever the air-support arrived he also correctly guided our airforce planes to the precise locations of CPB heavy-weapon crew and thus produced heavy damages on the enemy side and finally turned the battle to our favor.

In addition he had bravely led the battalion during the whole duration of the battle, constantly encouraged the warring men, continuously communicated with the Commands and reported the battle situations, and actively searched the enemy targets for the aerial attacks, all while enemy heavy-weapon shells were falling and exploding all around him and his men.